Stephen Hetherington
(2018). The redundancy problem: from knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism. Synthese, 195 (11), 4683-4702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1091-3.
(2017). Knowledge as potential for action. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 9 (2), n/a. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1070.
(2015). Technological knowledge-that as knowledge-how: a comment. Philosophy & Technology , 28 (4), 567-572. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0179-2.
(2013). Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism. Synthese, 190 (14), 2835-2851. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0088-9.
with de Almeida Claudio (2012). Guest editorial. Synthese, 188 (2), 143-143. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9929-1.
(2012). The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism. Synthese, 188 (2), 217-230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9924-6.
with de Almeida Claudio (eds) (2012). Synthese 188 (2).
(2010). Elusive epistemological justification. Synthese, 174 (3), 315-330. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9451-2.
(2009). Sceptical possibilities? no worries. Synthese, 168 (1), 97-118. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9332-8.
(2007). Is this a world where knowledge has to include justification? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (1), 41-69.
(2006). Knowledge's boundary problem. Synthese, 150 (1), 41-56. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6255-x.
(1991). On being epistemically intemal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (4), 855-871.