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(2007) Synthese 155 (1).
In this paper I distinguish two kinds of predictivism, ‘timeless’ and ‘historicized’. The former is the conventional understanding of predictivism. However, I argue that its defense in the works of John Worrall (Scerri and Worrall 2001, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32, 407–452; Worrall 2002, In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 1, 191–209) and Patrick Maher (Maher 1988, PSA 1988, 1, pp. 273) is wanting. Alternatively, I promote an historicized predictivism, and briefly defend such a predictivism at the end of the paper.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-6267-1
Full citation:
Hudson, R. (2007). What's really at issue with novel predictions?. Synthese 155 (1), pp. 1-20.
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