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(2009) Synthese 166 (2).
This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9285-3
Full citation:
Glanzberg, M. (2009). Semantics and truth relative to a world. Synthese 166 (2), pp. 281-307.
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