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(2016) Synthese 193 (3).
Two agents endowed with different categorisations engage in bargaining to reach an understanding and agree on a common categorisation. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually associate a region with the same category end up rebranding it under a different category. Finally, we show that this last equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction; that is, the unique equilibrium agreement may be inefficient.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0790-5
Full citation:
LiCalzi, M. , Maagli, N. (2016). Bargaining over a common categorisation. Synthese 193 (3), pp. 705-723.
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