Synthese

Repository | Journal | Volume

2017

518 Pages

ISBN n/a

Synthese

Doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility

Vol. 194 (8)

Edited by

Andrea Kruse, Heinrich Wansing

Publication details

Full citation:

Kruse, A. , Wansing, H. (eds) (2017). Doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility. Synthese 194 (8).

Table of Contents

Introduction to the special issue "doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility"

Kruse Andrea; Wansing Heinrich

2667-2671

Believing intentionally

Steup Matthias

2673-2694

Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief

Rott Hans

2695-2720

Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism

Nottelmann Nikolaj

2721-2744

Attitudinal control

McHugh Conor

2745-2762

Agency of belief and intention

Flowerree A. K.

2763-2784

On the analogy of free will and free belief

Wagner Verena

2785-2810

Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control

Kruse Andrea

2811-2842

Remarks on the logic of imagination

Wansing Heinrich

2843-2861

Should have known

Goldberg Sanford C.

2863-2894

Responsible belief and epistemic justification

Peels Rik

2895-2915

A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance

Krämer Stephan

2917-2930

Wigner's puzzle and the pythagorean heuristic

McDonnell Jane

2931-2948

Inscrutability and visual objects

Phillips Ben

2949-2971

Virtuous distinctions

Fleisher Will

2973-3003

Why broad content can't influence behaviour

Gaukroger Cressida

3005-3020

A Russellian account of suspended judgment

Atkins Philip

3021-3046

Time, change and time without change

Warmbrod Ken

3047-3067

Two new objections to explanationism

Appley Bryan C.; Stoutenburg Gregory

3069-3084

Rejecting Pereboom's empirical objection to agent-causation

Baker Jordan

3085-3100

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