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Recently, a small but growing literature has started to fill the gap in our understanding of mid and late nineteenth-century German philosophy. But entrenched historiographical narratives suggest nothing much of interest happened in German-language philosophy after Hegel and before Nietzsche and Frege. So why should philosophers care about that period? Christian Damböck's Deutscher Empirismus: Studien zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum 1830–1930 presents an argument for an unambiguous answer to that question, and one that matters for contemporary analytic philosophy. Naturalism in analytic philosophy, especially in philosophy of science, often seems in the grip of an over-emphasis on the methods and results of the natural sciences, as opposed to the humanities and social sciences. This can lead to the neglect of and difficulty making sense of those matters dealt with by the humanities and social sciences. For example, we have a rich and mature literature on natural kinds, but only a comparatively limited and as yet immature understanding of social kinds. Damböck's account of a tradition he calls German empiricism serves to illustrate what philosophy might look like if it took seriously the idea that knowledge is always embedded within a cultural and historical context, and thus that the theory of knowledge must be informed by those disciplines concerned with culture and history, namely, the Geisteswissenschaften.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-36383-3_11

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