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226583

(2017) Handbook of the philosophy of medicine, Dordrecht, Springer.

Dying and the end of life

James Stacey Taylor

pp. 529-538

When it comes to dying and the end of life, two claims are generally accepted: that the difference between a human's being alive and being dead is clear and that death is a harm to the one who dies. But, despite appearances, both of these claims are controversial. There are in fact three competing accounts of what it is for a human to die: the whole-brain approach, the higher-brain approach, and the cardiopulmonary approach. Second, while it is generally accepted that death is a harm to the one who dies, this view is challenged by Epicurus and his followers, who argue that death cannot be a harm for the one who dies. This entry will outline the three primary accounts of what it is for a human to die and then consider the arguments for and against the Epicurean approach to the end of life. It will then consider the implications of the Epicurean position for some of the primary issues in philosophy of medicine that arise at the end of life. Finally, it will consider the claim that the ending of a person's life removes the possibility that events that occur after it could harm her.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-8688-1_67

Full citation:

Taylor, J.S. (2017)., Dying and the end of life, in T. Schramme & S. D. Edwards (eds.), Handbook of the philosophy of medicine, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 529-538.

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