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(2015) Philosophy & Technology 28 (4).
Against Norström's argument for technological knowing how not being an instance of knowing that
Morgan Luck
pp. 573-579
In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson's proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström's argument.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s13347-014-0181-8
Full citation:
Luck, M. (2015). Against Norström's argument for technological knowing how not being an instance of knowing that. Philosophy & Technology 28 (4), pp. 573-579.
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