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Drawing on Wittgenstein's position on automatic ("blind") rule-following and certainty, this paper re-examines the claritas doctrine as a tool used in the interpretation of legal provisions. The paper focuses on the maxim clara non sunt interpretanda expounded by the Polish philosopher of law, Jerzy Wróblewski, and also comments on the acte clair and acte éclairé doctrines of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the claritas doctrine can be put forward in a legal dispute as a valid argument. The mere existence of a legal dispute appears to exclude the claim of interpretative clarity. One party in a dispute cannot invoke the claritas doctrine in order to counter or refute the claims of another party; allowing this would allegedly be contrary to the ethics of legal discourse. On the other hand, however, a party acting in bad faith may bring into play artificial doubts as to the normative content of an otherwise clear legal provision and challenge the opponent (or the authority deciding the case) to prove them wrong. In this case, should "legitimate" and "illegitimate" doubts be discerned—and who would be in a proper position to do it?Drawing on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, one way out of this dilemma is to shape a new incarnation of the argument from clarity. The argument should refer not to what people should think of the meaning of words (that is, in the context of this paper, how they should construe a legal provision), but rather to how people act when following such a provision. This paper's argument is that the routine practice of rule-following serves to substantiate the claim of clarity in a legal case. Such an understanding allows for the restoration of the claritas argument, though in a new form.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09375-8_23

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