Repository | Series | Book

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation.

The final chapters apply the developedconceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1

Full citation:

Introduction

Wright John

1-6

The skeptical arguments against realism i

Wright John

7-36

The skeptical arguments – 2

Wright John

37-77

Realism and inference to the best explanation

Wright John

79-115

On the inference to unobservables

Wright John

117-143

Underdetermination and theory preference

Wright John

145-165

Eddington inferences in science – 1

Wright John

167-190

Eddington inferences in science – 2

Wright John

191-215