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In Section 4.4,1 argued that any plausible theory of knowledge must include conditions that guarantee truth. Truth should not be tacked on as a further condition. This must be so in order to avoid the Gettier problem. I also argued that no internalist condition on knowledge could provide the necessary guarantee of truth. The only way that the truth of a belief can be assured is by a connection between fact and belief. In Chapters 4 and 5, I defended the claim that it is a causal link (more precisely, a k-causal connection) that is needed to make that connection. In this chapter, I examine alternative theories of knowledge that suggest a different sort of connection between fact and belief. In each case, I discuss whether or not the proposed connection is a necessary condition for knowledge and compare it with the k-causal condition.¹ I then discuss, putting objections to the particular theory to one side, whether or not the proposed connection allows knowledge of platonic objects.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_6

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