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(2001) Incommensurability and related matters, Dordrecht, Springer.
I aim to reject a semantic doctrine, "Incommensurability", commonly attributed to Kuhn and Feyerabend. They also subscribe to the neo-Kantian metaphysical doctrine of "Constructivism" which stands opposed to "Realism". I argue that the Incommensurability issue comes down to the Realism issue. On the Realism issue I reject four arguments for Constructivism. Two Kantian arguments make the mistakes of using an a priori methodology and of not "putting metaphysics first". Two arguments by Hoyningen-Huene and his co-authors support relativism but do nothing to support the Kantian core of Constructivism. I conclude by arguing against "meta-incommensurability".
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9680-0_5
Full citation:
Devitt, M. (2001)., Incommensurability and the priority of metaphysics, in H. Sankey (ed.), Incommensurability and related matters, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 143-157.
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