Repository | Book | Chapter

In this chapter, conceptions of order in neuroscience and psychology are compared and assessed from the perspective of a philosophy of creation order with its strong view on laws as necessitating principles, or conditions. Three questions guide the discussion: (1) Does it make a difference for the sciences of the person to maintain a strong notion of law? (2) Can the apparent tension between the creation order view and evolutionary accounts of lawfulness and order be diminished by employing the concept of emergence? (3) Can the concept of emergence be made compatible with a strong concept of law? I explore whether, and if so, to what extent, Herman Dooyeweerd's reformational philosophy—representative of the creation order approach—can accommodate evolutionary accounts of lawfulness. After a critical analysis of the emergence approaches of Philip Clayton and Evan Thompson, I conclude that the term emergence is used ambiguously, referring both to some sort of causal activity and to more abstract principles of self-organization. With respect to the three guiding questions, it is concluded that (1) a strong notion of law (or lawfulness) can play an important role in the struggle against reductionism in the sciences of the mind and the brain; (2) accommodation between the creation order view and evolutionary accounts is possible to a certain extent and the concept of emergence might play a role in this accommodation; (3) emergence should in that case be interpreted as a boundary concept.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-70881-2_10

Full citation: