Repository | Book | Chapter
(2016) Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer.
It is a familiar argument that advocates accommodating the paradoxes of decision theory by abandoning the "independence" postulate. After all, if we grant that choice reveals preference, the anomalous choice patterns of the Allais and Ellsberg problems (reviewed in section "Review of the Allais and Ellsberg "Paradoxes") violate postulate P2 ('sure thing") of Savage's (The foundations of statistics. Wiley, New York, 1954) system.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_20
Full citation:
Seidenfeld, T. (2016)., Decision theory without "independence" or without "ordering", in H. Arló-Costa, V. F. Hendricks & J. Van Benthem (eds.), Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 361-384.