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In the science of cognition, as in many other sciences, it is often assumed that the biggest problem of cognition is the lack, loss or distortion of information. Were it not for human limitations in information processing capacity, cognition would not be worth studying. Much of our cognitive development in childhood seems to be geared to mastering the distinction between appearance and reality (see 5), and once the necessary cognitive and intersubjective skills for this mastery are developed, they support the view that problems of cognition are problems of lack, loss or distortion of information (i.e. reality). It would be foolish to deny the importance of these limitations. But there is also another side to the coin: that certain kinds of experience owe their existence to the fact that the human cognitive capacities are limited. In this paper, I will present a theory of experience that fully acknowledges this seeming paradox and I will elaborate some consequences for philosophy that seem quite important to me¹. Philosophically, the paper is driven by two related ideas: that of complementarity (see Lindenberg & Oppenheim 1974) and that of bargain situations (see Lindenberg & Oppenheim 1978).

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2779-0_14

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