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(1992) Nature, cognition and system II, Dordrecht, Springer.
Bohr's framework of complementarity should be understood as a realist interpretation of quantum physics, but in order to defend such a reading of Bohr, the epistemic goal of representationalism as applied to atomic objects must be abandoned. This implies that complementarity rejects the meta-epistemic presuppositions of the Cartesian spectator epistemology, but if this epistemological lesson is accepted, then it remains possible to have knowledge about the atomic objects which in interacting with observing systems produce the atomic phenomena that confirm the quantum theoretical account of the atomic domain.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2779-0_4
Full citation:
Folse, H. J. (1992)., Complementarity and our knowledge of nature, in M. E. Carvallo (ed.), Nature, cognition and system II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 51-66.
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