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(1975) Science in flux, Dordrecht, Springer.

Criteria for plausible arguments

Joseph Agassi

pp. 353-364

The most conspicuous datum in philosophy, perhaps the most important one as well, is the following:(d) Most philosophers consider the thesis of scepticism1 highly implausible, yet they consider the traditional arguments in its defence highly plausible at first glance. The rationale for the qualifier "at first glance" in the datum is the following generally accepted thesis concerning plausibility, (p) A thesis defensible by plausible arguments is plausible, and vice versa. Most philosophers woudl accept our plausibility thesis (p) as a matter of course, if not as analytic. Hence, our datum (d) without the qualifier " at first glance" would allow us to charge most philosophers with inconsistency. (c) Most philosophers are inconsistent in viewing sceptism as both implausible and plausible. The charge is answered, of course, by the qualifier which will force us or midfy (c) by qualifying "plausible" in it with 'seeming", and this qualifying "inconsistent" likewise.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1810-4_16

Full citation:

Agassi, J. (1975). Criteria for plausible arguments, in Science in flux, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 353-364.

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