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(2017) Psychiatry and neuroscience update II, Dordrecht, Springer.
Aristotelian hylomorphism
a framework for non-physicalist philosophers about philosophy of mind
Ricardo F. Crespo
pp. 37-46
The results of a recent survey on the philosophical views of contemporary, mainly Anglo-Saxon professional philosophers have shown that a supposed predominance of physicalist reductionist positions in the philosophy of neurosciences is far from unanimous. This paper explores one possible philosophical position rooting a non-physicalist reductionist conception of mind. It suggests and argues that a classical philosophical frame, Aristotelian hylomorphism, provides adequate non-reductionist answers that do not fall into dualisms. Finally, it offers the corresponding conclusions.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-53126-7_4
Full citation:
Crespo, R. F. (2017)., Aristotelian hylomorphism: a framework for non-physicalist philosophers about philosophy of mind, in , Psychiatry and neuroscience update II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 37-46.
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