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Critics often complain that the "new atheists' are arrogant, dogmatic, closed-minded and so on. Those terms denote "epistemic (or intellectual) vices', or vices of the mind, so we can call those criticisms "vice charges'. Although they are very common, it is unclear whether they are merely rhetorical or whether they are substantive criticisms. The aim of this chapter is therefore to offer a framework for articulating and assessing these charges. I offer such a framework and consider two specific vices—arrogance and dogmatism—and ask, in each case, whether new atheists are vulnerable to a charge of vice. My conclusions are that: vice-charges are far more complex than critics appreciate; that critics can, at the least, say that certain new atheists may well be vulnerable to certain charges of epistemic vice; and that much more work needs to be done before one can charge new atheists with vices in a fair and robust way.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-54964-4_4

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