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(2017) Axiomathes 27 (3).
The metaphysical requirement for models of prediction and explanationist approaches to the problem of induction
Jaeho Lee
pp. 225-242
David Armstrong once argued that to solve the problem of induction with inference to the best explanation we need an anti-Humean conception of law. Some Humeans have argued that this argument begs the question against Humeanism. In this paper, I propose a new argument for the same conclusion which is not vulnerable to this criticism. In particular, I argue that explanationist approaches to the problem of induction that are combined with Humeanism is internally incoherent.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s10516-016-9299-x
Full citation:
Lee, J. (2017). The metaphysical requirement for models of prediction and explanationist approaches to the problem of induction. Axiomathes 27 (3), pp. 225-242.
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