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(2018) Women phenomenologists on social ontology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Do we-experiences require an intentional object?
on the nature of reflective communities (following Gerda Walther)
Sebastian Luft
pp. 129-143
These and similar questions are dealt with, within the Phenomenological Movement, under the headings "phenomenology of intersubjectivity" and "social ontology." (Although some may see significant differences between both terms—phenomenology of intersubjectivity being perhaps committed to transcendental phenomenology, social ontology perhaps erring on the side of realism—I take them to be more or less synonymous here. As will become clear in the further discussion in this paper, any designation as "transcendental" or "realistic" is inessential for the phenomenon under discussion here. The success of this analysis is, thus, independent of Stein's and Walther's rejection of Husserl's transcendental turn.) Specific to a phenomenological treatment of these topics is the question as to the nature of a sociality or community, specifically regarding the acts on the part of a sociality, and its specific object.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-97861-1_10
Full citation:
Luft, S. (2018)., Do we-experiences require an intentional object?: on the nature of reflective communities (following Gerda Walther), in S. Luft & R. Hagengruber (eds.), Women phenomenologists on social ontology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 129-143.
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