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(2013) Synthese 190 (14).
In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the pedestrian observation that beliefs stand or fall with their bases. The theory I offer is an elucidation and refinement of this thought.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0111-1
Full citation:
Evans, I. (2013). The problem of the basing relation. Synthese 190 (14), pp. 2943-2957.
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