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(1990) Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Mental representation and meaning
arguments against the computational view
William E. Smythe
pp. 261-266
The present paper surveys and discusses some notable recent critiques of the computational theory of mind. Computational environments normally include at least three distinct levels: physical implementation, formal computation, and semantic interpretation. The computational theory of mind is problematic insofar as it attempts to collapse the semantic level onto the other two levels. The problems are brought into focus by discussing three recent critiques of computationalism by John Searle (1980, 1984), John Heil (1981), and Hilary Putnam (1988). It is argued that mental representation, like more public symbolic activities, functions relative to the interpretive practices of a community.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4613-9688-8_25
Full citation:
Smythe, W. E. (1990)., Mental representation and meaning: arguments against the computational view, in M. E. Hyland, W. J. Baker, R. Van Hezewijk & S. J. S. Terwee (eds.), Recent trends in theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 261-266.
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