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(2010) Synthese 174 (3).

Elusive epistemological justification

Stephen Hetherington

pp. 315-330

What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9451-2

Full citation:

Hetherington, S. (2010). Elusive epistemological justification. Synthese 174 (3), pp. 315-330.

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