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(2014) Synthese 191 (16).
According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism—arguments based on naturalism and motivation—lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view—the Argument from Coincidence—is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one’s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. Responses are considered and shown to be inadequate.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6
Full citation:
Cowie, C. (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191 (16), pp. 4003-4017.
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