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H.-D. Gondek and L. Tengelyi note in their New Phenomenology in France that even if it is true that . phenomenology, since its beginning, is characterized by its opposition to the whole European metaphysical tradition ., phenomenology does not consist so much in invalidating metaphysics as such, but rather in dealing with metaphysical issues proper without founding itself in speculation, by making use of its own means, and by liberating itself from all presuppositions. From this perspective – nuanced, discussed and partly disputed throughout the essay –, my contribution attempts to build a typology of different possible phenomenological interpretations of metaphysics. Doing so, I attempt to interpret the works of some representatives of the phenomenological movement in terms of four basic attitudes towards metaphysics: phenomenological critique of speculative metaphysics, phenomenology as first philosophy, metaphysics of grounds that cannot be founded in a phenomenological way, and ‘an-archical’ phenomenology.

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