Neither one nor many
Husserl on the primal mode of the I
Husserl's concept of "primal I" (Ur-Ich) is well known but difficult to understand. In this chapter, I present a clue to figuring out what is at stake in this concept. First, I refer to Husserl's claim that the primal I cannot be pluralized. This claim can be understood in the sense that this ego is neither one of many egos nor a single all-encompassing entity. Second, in order to show that this character of "neither-one-nor-many" is not anything extraordinary, I shall refer to the fact that in natural languages we encounter this same character. Finally, I will address the problem of our fundamental perspective from which we most usually see the world. By doing this, I will claim that the seemingly strange character of the "primal I" indicates an experience that is "too obvious' to face in our daily life.
Taguchi, S. (2019)., Neither one nor many: Husserl on the primal mode of the I, in N. De Warren & S. Taguchi (eds.), New phenomenological studies in Japan, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 57-68.
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