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In a recently published book,¹ Karl Popper has set himself the task of analyzing the methods of scientific research and finding a solution for those problems that lie at the focal point of all logical questions of science: the problems of induction and probability. An investigation of these problems is certainly a worthy endeavor, if only because it seems to be necessary to attempt every conceivable solution in this complex field before deciding on the definitive answer. Furthermore, Popper deserves credit for relying heavily upon mathematics and physics and making extensive use of the conceptual tools of logical positivism in the development of his ideas. The discussion is thereby elevated to the plane of scientific philosophy, and we need not be bothered with hazy trains of thought that cannot progress beyond metaphor — as is, alas, too often the case with philosophical discussions. But with all due recognition of the sincerity of the intention, I nonetheless unfortunately feel compelled to declare my opposition to the theses presented in Popper's book, for they appear to me to be completely untenable. I see this as related to the fact that the earnest of the methods fails to measure up to the earnest of the intention. It is simply not enough to make use of the conceptual constructs of logic; in the treatment of epistemological problems, it is necessary to think through the applicability of these concepts to their most remote consequences and thus to create a method that transfers to material problems the certainty attaching to formal logic. It can be shown in detail, point for point, that failure to carry out a critique of this kind bears the responsibility for the defects in Popper's book. To analyze here every single one of Popper's ideas would take us too far afield. I will therefore limit myself to picking out the principal points and criticizing them in turn.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9855-1_15

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