Repository | Book | Chapter
(2018) Freud and philosophy of mind I, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Freud provides a number of arguments directly against the consciousness criterion—the view that mind equals consciousness. In this chapter, I evaluate these critical arguments and argue that, although many understand these to be the primary arguments Freud marshals for his positive position, they fail to do the stand-alone work that they are claimed to do. The problem, I argue, is that to argue against Cartesianism one cannot directly attack the consciousness criterion. Rather, one must start by understanding consciousness and identifying its mental-relevant essence.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-96343-3_8
Full citation:
Wakefield, J. C. (2018). Freud's direct arguments against the consciousness criterion, in Freud and philosophy of mind I, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 241-262.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.