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(2011) Psychology as a moral science, Dordrecht, Springer.
In the previous chapters, it has been argued that psychologists ought to think about morality not only as something real, but also as something that co-constitutes psychological phenomena. Now, the question is: In what way? Can we specify the mode of existence of morality and moral phenomena? I will attempt such specification in the present chapter by following up on the previous two chapters and argue that practices are the sources of moral intelligibility. This is contrary to two other dominant views according to which emotions and desires (cf. Hume) and universal rational procedures (cf. Kant) are the sources of moral intelligibility. By linking morality to practices we are able to think of it as real and objective and at the same time as something tradition bound with a cultural history. We can perhaps think of morality as something relative without being relativists (LaFollette, 2000).
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7067-1_7
Full citation:
Brinkmann, S. (2011). Moral practices, in Psychology as a moral science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 123-144.
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