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(2009) Topics in early modern philosophy of mind, Dordrecht, Springer.
So complained David Hume, who then went on to offer his conception of the self as an evolving bundle of perceptions, and who yet later in the Appendix, declared that his position was beset with difficulties.In this paper I argue for a fresh understanding of Hume's famous Complaint (as well as his remarks in the Appendix). Specifically, I place the Complaint within the context of a dispute between Berkeley and Hume concerning self and self-consciousness.2 I use Locke's innovative notion of self as the backdrop for my discussion.3 My aim is to show the value of examining this important philosophical moment other than as a response to Descartes (as our prevailing cultural account would have it).4 Instead, by looking to Berkeley we can secure a far deeper appreciation of what is at stake for Hume.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-2381-0_9
Full citation:
Bettcher, T.M. (2009)., Berkeley and Hume on self and self-consciousness, in J. Miller (ed.), Topics in early modern philosophy of mind, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 193-222.
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