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(2016) Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer.

Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium

Robert Aumann

pp. 863-894

Game theoretic reasoning has been widely applied in economics in recent years. Undoubtedly, the most commonly used tool has been the strategic equilibrium of Nash (Ann Math 54:286–295, 1951), or one or another of its so-called "refinements." Though much effort has gone into developing these refinements, relatively little attention has been paid to a more basic question: Why consider Nash equilibrium in the first place?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41

Full citation:

Aumann, R. (2016)., Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium, in H. Arló-Costa, V. F. Hendricks & J. Van Benthem (eds.), Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 863-894.

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