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190796

(2009) Towards mathematical philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer.

On meta-knowledge and truth

Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska

pp. 319-343

The paper deals with the problem of logical adequacy of language knowledge with cognition of reality. A logical explication of the concept of language knowledge conceived of as a kind of codified knowledge is taken into account in the paper. Formal considerations regarding the notions of meta-knowledge (logical knowledge about language knowledge) and truth are developed in the spirit of some ideas presented in the author's earlier papers (Theory of Language Syntax. Categorial Approach, 1991; Synthese 116(2): 231–277, 1998; Logical Ideas of Roman Suszko, Proceedings of the Wide-Poland Conference of History of Logic, pp. 89–119, 2001; Bulleting of Symbolic Logic 7(1): 157–158, 2001; Studia Logica 85: 107–134, 263–276, 2007; Gödel Centenary 2006: Posters, Collegium Logicum, pp. 87–91, 2007) treating about the notions of meaning, denotation and truthfulness of well-formed expressions (wfes) of any given categorial language. Three aspects connected with knowledge codified in language are considered, including: 1) syntax and two kinds of semantics: intensional and extensional, 2) three kinds of non-standard language models and 3) three notions of truthfulness of wfes. Adequacy of language knowledge to cognitive objects is understood as an agreement of truthfulness of sentences in these three models.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9084-4_16

Full citation:

Wybraniec-Skardowska, (2009)., On meta-knowledge and truth, in D. Makinson, J. Malinowski & H. Wansing (eds.), Towards mathematical philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 319-343.

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