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(2014) Consciousness inside and out, Dordrecht, Springer.
From phenomenology to the self-measurement methodology of first-person data
Gualtiero Piccinini , Corey Maley
pp. 27-32
Ruth Millikan argues that there is no "legitimate phenomenology of experience": that there is no method—not even a fallible or partially reliable one—for accurately describing our experiences in the first-person. The reason is that there is no method for checking that the ideas we think we have about experience are about anything at all. Like phlogiston, there may be no such things as the properties we take experience to have.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_3
Full citation:
Piccinini, G. , Maley, C. (2014)., From phenomenology to the self-measurement methodology of first-person data, in R. S. Brown (ed.), Consciousness inside and out, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 27-32.
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