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In the present paper I argue that luck attributions are structured by points of view. In particular, whether one is prepared to say that an event or a person is lucky is partly determined by one's temporal perspective. If an event is seen in isolation, at a moment in time, it might not be a matter of luck at all, but when the same event is considered as an element in a temporal series, then it becomes either lucky or unlucky. Since neither temporal point of view enjoys any kind of logical priority or metaphysical privilege, it is not possible to make consistent assignments of luck without first assuming a synchronic or a diachronic point of view. Since no extant theory of luck acknowledges or incorporates such points of view, all fall short of adequacy. This failure matters broadly in philosophy, because understanding luck underwrites a number of philosophical projects.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19815-6_9

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