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This chapter presents a critical account of the views of the Scandinavian Realists of John Austin's jurisprudence. The Dane Alf Ross has a favourable view of Austin's methodological approach that restricts law to positive law to be defined in terms of commands passed by the sovereign, although Ross objects that it is a mistake to locate the sovereign outside the law. Ross also lauds Austin for his distinction between the existence of a law and its merit, leading to different inquiries into the law, although Ross rejects Austin's inquiry into the merit of the positive law based upon the principle of utility as superficial and without any interests for lawyers. By contrast, the Swedes have a negative view of Austin's jurisprudence. Thus Hägerström holds that it is impossible to define the positive law in terms of the will, and the model for Austin's theory is pure despotism. Lundstedt follows suit and claims that Austin's jurisprudence is devoid of any meaning. Olivecrona endorses Austin's view that the concept of command is important for the analysis of the concept of law, but he rejects Austin's analysis to arrive at the view that a positive law is an independent imperative that does not express any personal will but regulates the use of force. Ross follows Olivecrona's analysis but prefers to use the technical term directive that is defined as utterances with no representative meaning but with intent to exercise influence. Thus legal rules are used by the legal officials to cause the appropriate behaviour among people as the effect and this implies that the positive law has a place in the world as a link in the chain of cause and effect. However another implication of the Scandinavian view is that legal rules are devoid of any conceptual meaning which is tantamount to legal nihilism and the related view that there is no legal knowledge which is legal scepticism.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-4830-9_6

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