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The main problem to be discussed in this paper has a long philosophical tradition. It emerged for the first time in reflections on vague terms in common language. The term (a) "youth" (in the sense of a young man) may serve as a classical example. There is practically no doubt that a man under 18 is still a youth, and that no one over 30 is any longer a youth. But what about a person who is, for instance, 25 years old? The meaning assigned to that term in common language is such that we are not in a position to answer the question. What then is the nature of a statement that a person aged 25 is a youth? Is it a true or a false, but essentially undecidable statement, as some claim ? Or is it deprived of any truth value, as others would have it? Or is it, perhaps, the case that both the statement and its negation are false, as still others maintain, thereby rejecting the principle of the excluded middle — one of the fundamental laws of logic? These questions lead to further questions. What, in fact, is such a statement about? Does the term "youth" denote any definite set of objects ? And if it does, then what is that set?

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9777-6_27

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