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Truth-correspondence is the basic analytical-philosophical premise that "propositions are true when they correspond to reality". Tarski provides a view on truth-correspondence outside of legal discourse. His "Convention T" holds that a proposition is true if and only if that proposition can be proven true within the language expressing it. Within that theory, and legal reasoning in general, a proposition is either "true" or "false". This mechanical approach is a form of semiotic activity, but limits the scope of analysis. "Truth" is constructed again and again with each case and each legal finding, yet each finding leads no closer to any particular legal truth.Peirce provides a third factor to the truth-test that is semiotic, or sign-related. Truth and falsity can both describe a proposition, but also allow for the possibility of the "unknown". If a proposition is "unknown," then its truth-value cannot be determined, and as a result, the proposition's relation to other propositions is also unclear. This lack of clarity expands semiotic analysis, but legal discourse seeks to avoid this malleability at all costs, resulting in a self-referential system that taints general discourse by imposing legal meanings as "truth". Even though the law cannot allow itself to recognize interpretants outside of its institutional boundaries, the individual can, if it is seen as an interpretant, not the interpretant. Through the semiotic analysis of truth-theory, the individual finds that the truth is always relative (that is, sign-relative) and not intrinsically linked to the declarations of the powerful, whether that power is invested in a legal body or a natural language.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-1341-3_3

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