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While both pluralism and toleration accommodate diversities among individuals and groups, from a liberal perspective, it seems that the development and spread of pluralism since the middle of the twentieth century has to do with limiting the role and scope of toleration. In this chapter I focus on two major liberal approaches that examine the changing relations between toleration and pluralism amidst the present pluralist condition: One approach, defended by Popper, emphasizes the problem of toleration becoming "easygoing," even toward intolerance and violence. Second approach, defended by Horton, Heyd, and others, emphasizes the growing difficulties to justify and practice genuine toleration. However, both approaches have a similar solution: restricting toleration within the bounds of a legitimized model of pluralism. Examining the arguments and assumptions of both approaches, I suggest that with the spread of pluralism, within liberal and illiberal models, the "new" role of toleration is to challenge the "unreasonable" and the "illegitimate" beyond any pluralist model and thus prevent a hasty and seemingly necessary move from pluralism to intolerance. I then propose a maxim: If from the perspective of any pluralist model some beliefs and practices are (or become) unreasonable or illegitimate, try first a tolerant attitude, and only then, if toleration fails, appeal to intolerance.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-7131-4_12

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