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(2015) Unifying the philosophy of truth, Dordrecht, Springer.
Leitgeb (2005) proposes a new approach to semantic paradoxes, based upon a direct definition of the set of grounded sentences in terms of dependence upon non-semantic state of affairs. In the present paper, we account for the extensional disagreement between this dependence approach and more familiar alethic approaches. In order to do so, we study the behavior of dependence jumps and alethic jumps, and provide an equivalence result for the two approaches.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_18
Full citation:
Bonnay, D. , van Vugt, F.T. (2015)., Groundedness, truth and dependence, in T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the philosophy of truth, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 355-368.
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