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A major critique of classical metaphysics, first made by Nietzsche and echoed again and again by Continental philosophers, is that, from its very beginnings in Plato and Aristotle through its fulfillment in Hegel, metaphysics has in fact been "onto-theology.' This means, in Heidegger's terminology, that the difference between Being and beings — the "ontological difference' — has been overlooked, because Being (as the event of coming into unconcealment) has been reduced to a highest kind of Being, viz. God, who is conceived as the already available Ground of all other beings. In classical theism, after all, God is a Being, albeit the supreme One. He is conceived as the Highest Substance, or Ground; but the very stress on God as the Highest Being, or Ipsum Esse subsistens, has, according to Heidegger, obscured the real historical Event of coining-into-presence (Seinsgeschick, the Mittence of Being). Heidegger, surely one of the most influential thinkers on the contemporary European scene, writes: "Metaphysics is "onto-theo-logic.' Someone who has experienced theology from its growing origin — the theology of Christian belief as well as philosophical theology — prefers today to keep silent about God within the reach of thought."¹ Heidegger tends to criticize not just a certain kind of theodicy, but metaphysical God-talk in general: "... Causa sui. That is the right name for the God of philosophy. But man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this God. Before the causa sui man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor play music and dance. This godless thinking which must abandon the God of philosophy, God as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God."² Thus while one may indeed wonder what "God' could mean for Heidegger, it clearly is not identifiable with "Being.' The religious and the metaphysical ultimates do not coincide.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1014-5_8

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