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(2012) From psychology to phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer.
"Intentional inexistence" and the separation of "psychic" from "physical" phenomena
Biagio G Tassone
pp. 108-135
In this chapter we turn our attention to Book Two of Brentano's PES and present an overview of its first four chapters. Book Two carries the title "Von den psychischen Phänomenen im Allgemeinen", which can be rendered as "On Psychological Phenomena in General" although "Mental Phenomena in General" is also an acceptable translation.1 These sections of the PES include some of the most important ideas in Brentano's text and introduce themes that would become highly influential on subsequent philosophy of mind. In particular, they introduce the single most important doctrine for understanding the essential distinction between "psychic" or mental and "physical" phenomena, i.e. the "intentional inexistence" of mental or psychic acts. After giving a critical outline and commentary on these sections, the theoretical core of Brentano's philosophical psychology is explored in detail and an analysis of the structural properties of consciousness and the intrinsic characteristics of mental acts in the PES will be given. Finally, after the interpretation of the doctrine of intentional inexistence, and the nature and the unity of consciousness as conceived by Brentano is outlined, it is argued that a tension is present in the PES, pertaining to the status of consciousness as a temporally unified continuum said to simultaneously unify itself while relating to both objects and its discrete acts.
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Full citation:
Tassone, B.G. (2012). "Intentional inexistence" and the separation of "psychic" from "physical" phenomena, in From psychology to phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 108-135.
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