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Subjectivity in psychology

a systematic or a historical challenge?

Sven Hroar Klempe

pp. 209-225

Given that subjectivity forms the core of psychology as a science, to what extent is it meaningful to make a clear distinction between a historical and a systematic approach? This is the key question this paper pursues along two lines: one is by investigating whether subjectivity actually has been an aspect of modern psychology for the last couple of centuries, and the other is by examining whether subjectivity in psychology requires a historical or a systematic approach. Søren Kierkegaard and Wilhelm Dilthey are referred to as the most important exponents of subjectivity in psychology combined with a historical understanding, whereas Gustav Bergmann and Paul Lazarsfeld are presented as exponents of developing psychology into an objective science where systematic approaches are regarded as superior.The findings demonstrate, however, that subjectivity has been and still is an unavoidable aspect of psychology, even for those who aim at making psychology an objective science. In addition, those who emphasize subjectivity as a core aspect of psychology make a clear distinction between subjectivity in psychology and objectivity in science, which also represents a huge challenge when they are combined. This combination appears when theories are constructed in psychology. Thus one of the most important findings is that theory construction can never be performed without being related to existing theories, which are by necessity given as historical events. Hence, it is important in theory construction to make a distinction between how historical theories have been generally understood and how they were originally formulated.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-42760-7_11

Full citation:

Klempe, S. (2016)., Subjectivity in psychology: a systematic or a historical challenge?, in S. Hroar klempe & R. Smith (eds.), Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 209-225.

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