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(2010) Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science, Dordrecht, Springer.
De facto, subjects are bodily, but is this necessarily so? This question unfolds into the following two: Can one be self-conscious without being a body? Can one be self-conscious without being bodily-conscious? In this paper, I will describe different aspects of bodily-self-consciousness and argue that the most radical attempts to demonstrate the contingency of the bodily nature of self-consciousness failed. The idea here is that the strength of the anchoring of self-consciousness in the body and bodily-consciousness can be evaluated by considering whether (and which) forms of bodily-self-consciousness resist even against radical theoretical and clinical cases of purported disembodiment.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_10
Full citation:
Legrand, D. (2010)., Myself with no body?: body, bodily-consciousness and self-consciousness, in S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 180-200.
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