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(1975) The study of time II, Dordrecht, Springer.

Time

being or consciousness alone? — a realist view

M. Matsumoto

pp. 206-215

Experience of matter can be described in the context of time and space, whereas, some people say, experience of mind may be described according to time only. Accordingly, though time and space together are regarded as objective forms, one may have a propensity for treating time alone as a particular form of the subjective consciousness. For space is indeed referred to the self-evidence of being, while time is thought to belong rather to the self-evidence of our own consciousness. According to my opinion, however, even the spatial description is indispensable for the state of "mind". For instance, the contents of our consciousness can be described only in terms of the localized phases of their images. Contrary to Kant, who regarded time and space together as forms of the outer intuition (i.e. as conditions of sensation), and time alone as form of the inner sense, I have a firm intention to assert them both as two forms of objective being because it is the being itself that can be the ultimate object of any of our cognitive powers — sensation, understanding and reason. Time and space are not forms proper to a particular "being" such as conscious existence like ours; they are also, nay, above all, two objective forms of being in general that transcends all such limited existences. It follows that these forms themselves, once abstracted in our mind, must, first of all, be valid for material beings; after that, i.e. derivatively and analogically, they may also be valid for mind-beings. The main aim of this paper is "dialectically" to elucidate that fact on the subject of time in particular.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-50121-0_14

Full citation:

Matsumoto, M. (1975)., Time: being or consciousness alone? — a realist view, in J. T. Fraser & N. Lawrence (eds.), The study of time II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 206-215.

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