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Inter-level explanation and the category-mistake

Bruno Mölder

pp. 283-294

From a common-sense point of view, we have beliefs and desires; sometimes we have pain and other sensations, some with a pleasant, some with an unpleasant quality; and we, as rational persons, act on reasons and cite our beliefs and desires to justify the things we have done. The common-sense approach is self-contained: there appears to be no need for explanations in addition to those already given from the everyday perspective. When somebody asks why I closed the window, I would answer that I felt cold. It might be that this person is not happy with that answer, so I might add that I believed that closing the window helps me to avoid the unpleasant feeling of coldness. Now, that should settle the issue definitely. However, we might imagine that there is also a neuroscientist in the room, who uses the opportunity to give an alternative explanation to the situation. The neuroscientist may use terms like thermal receptors, hypothalamus, neural transmitters, and so on. What is the relation between these two stories? In this essay, I sketch one particular kind of answer to this question and look at some of the obstacles that this answer has to avoid, if it is to be successful.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0672-9_21

Full citation:

Mölder, B. (2001)., Inter-level explanation and the category-mistake, in R. Vihalemm (ed.), Estonian studies in the history and philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 283-294.

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