Internal, formal and thin relations
One of Kevin Mulligan's major contributions to the philosophy of relations is his ingenious distinction between thin and thick relations—or, more accurately, between "thin" and "thick" relational predicates. Mulligan's own view is that true relational thick predications do not need genuinely thick relations among their truthmakers. Although I disagree with this conclusion, I propose to explore further some of the most intriguing links between his thin/thick distinction and a few other more traditional divides—such as the "internal/external" or the "formal/material" dichotomies—and I try to assess their respective metaphysical import, focussing on the ontological status of so-called grounded relations.
Clementz, F. (2014)., Internal, formal and thin relations, in A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, values, and metaphysics I, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 207-223.
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