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(2011) European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1).
Peirce's post-jamesian pragmatism
Nathan Houser
It is commonly supposed that the pragmatisms of Peirce and James are fundamentally opposed; this view is supported by the fact that in 1905 Peirce deliberately chose a new name for his original doctrine. Yet Peirce and James were not only life-long friends but to a surprising extent were life-long collaborators. It is true that their approaches to philosophy were very different, reflecting their distinct personalities, with James exhibiting a pluralistic and humanistic style as opposed to Peirce the analyst and formalist. James was a popular philosopher and Peirce a philosopher for philosophers. But they followed each other’s work, corresponded about philosophical problems, and deeply influenced each other. Peirce never completely renounced James’s broader pragmatism and tried hard to find common ground, even to some extent reshaping his own views to accommodate James’s.
Publication details
DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.866
Full citation:
Houser, N. (2011). Peirce's post-jamesian pragmatism. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1), pp. n/a.
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