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(2011) European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (2).
The article addresses three theses on judgment in general and legal judgment in particular, starting from Peirce’s and Dewey’s claims about them. The first thesis, ontological, concerns the content of an act of judgment and says that judgment is about an object instantiating a property (not about a property instantiated by an object). The second, alethic, concerns the relation between judgment and truth and says that judgment is the attribution of a truth value to a proposition. The third, genetic, deals with the moments of judgment claiming it is a process susceptible of being articulated in such moments. Its fundamental moments are 1) hypothesis, 2) inquiry, 3) result. The article claims that the three theses interconnect and hold for both judgment in general and legal judgment, given that the latter is a model of the former; so a complex conception of judgment is articulated, discussing also its relations with assertion and inference.
Publication details
DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.851
Full citation:
Tuzet, G. (2011). Legal judgment as a philosophical archetype: a pragmatist analysis of three theses. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (2), pp. n/a.
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