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One of the most problematic issues with regard to Husserl's phenomenology of time concerns the definition of the relationship between the time of the intentional acts and the absolute pre-phenomenal flow of time constituting consciousness. In this regard, Brough distinguishes between the intentional acts (such as perception and recollection) and the specific dimension of the absolute flow of time-consciousness in terms of a distinction between two different levels. In the book Self-awareness and Alterity, Zahavi questions the validity of this distinction: the inner time-consciousness should not be regarded as an additional flow aware of the intentional act, but it is nothing but the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act. Despite essential differences, a common presupposition characterizes both of the above mentioned interpretations of the absolute time-constituting flow: the absolute flow is indifferent to the acts; it always flows in the same way, automatically; the form of the absolute flow is unchangeable. In my essay I will challenge the validity of this thesis from two different angles: (1) I will show the essential ambiguity of Husserl's configuration of the absolute flow not only in the context of the Zeitvorlesungen 1905, but also in relation to the Bernauer Manuskripte. (2) I will take into consideration Husserl's analyses of specific temporal experiences: the time of the unclear Phantasia and the experience of the radically new.

DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-8766-9_9

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